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Abstract
Since the beginning of the nancial crisis, a lively debate has
emerged regarding which monetary policy rule the Fed (and other
central banks) should follow, if any. To clarify this debate, several
questions must be answered. Which monetary policy rule ts best the
historical data? Which monetary policy rule best minimizes economic
uncertainty and the Feds loss function? Which rule is best in terms
of household welfare? Among the di¤erent rules, are NGDP growth or
level targeting rules a good option, and when? Do they perform better
than Taylor-type rules? To answer these questions, we use Bayesian
estimations to test the Smets and Wouters (2007) model under nine
di¤erent monetary policy rules with US data from 1955 to 2015 and
over three di¤erent sub-periods. We nd that when considering only
the central banks loss function, the estimates generally indicate the
superiority of NGDP level targeting rules, whatever the period. How-
ever, if other criteria are considered, the central banks objectives are
not consistently met by a single rule for all periods.
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1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), there has been a
lively debate among economists regarding which rules (if any) and objectives
central banks should use to stabilize the economy. As interest rates declined
to the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB), reductions in nominal interest rates may
have dragged agents into liquidity traps and appeared to do little to stimulate
economic activity. Consequently, nominal interest rates in various economies
(the US, Eurozone and some other developed or emerging market economies)
frequently deviated substantially from the path determined by standard or
augmented Taylor rules.
Monetary economists generally contend that central bankers should fol-
low policy rules rather than use their own discretion when devising monetary
policy. Debates held during the 1970s and 1980s suggested nominal income
targeting concepts, even if they were not always presented as such (Friedman,
1971; Meade, 1978; McCallum, 1973, 1987). The consensus on Taylor (1993)
rules increased during the last two decades (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997;
Svensson, 1999; Taylor, 1999). However, criticism of such monetary policy
rules also increased (Hall and Mankiw, 1994; Frankel and Chinn, 1995; Mc-
Callum and Nelson, 1999; Rudebusch, 2002a), especially during the GFC
(Hendrickson, 2012; Woodford, 2012; Frankel, 2014; Sumner, 2014; Belongia
and Ireland, 2015; McCallum, 2015; Sumner, 2015), arguing that nominal
income targeting could be a better way to achieve the central banksobjec-
tives.
Did paths deviating from a strict Taylor rule perform better in terms of
achieving growth and stability than those generated by other Taylor-type
rules? Would a nominal GDP (NGDP) rule be more e¤ective for achieving
price stability and high growth?
Addressing these questions is crucial to implement proper monetary poli-
cies.
An interesting way to compare and evaluate di¤erent monetary policy
proposals and rules is to introduce them within the framework of a macro-
economic Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model. Because
the dynamics are so important and di¢ cult to work through intuitively, these
empirical models can provide invaluable assistance in clarifying the matter
(Taylor, 2013).
As in Taylor and Wieland (2012), our objective is to use such models to
evaluate di¤erent monetary policy rules and their consequences in terms of
the central banks loss and household welfare. Garín et al. (2016) perform
such an analysis by evaluating the welfare properties of nominal GDP tar-
geting. They nd that output gap targeting is the most desirable rule but
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that nominal GDP targeting performs nearly as well.
Our paper compares Taylor-type and nominal income rules through the
Smets and Wouters (2007) model, a well-known baseline DSGE model tted
for the US. In this model, both parameters and structural shocks are re-
lated to deeper structural parameters describing household preferences and
technological and institutional constraints. These micro foundations provide
a theoretical framework that could be particularly useful in an econometric
analysis of the optimality of various policy strategies.
Our monetary policy rules are of three types: Taylor-type rules; nominal
income growth targeting rules, and nominal income level targeting rules.
There are three Taylor-type rules following: (1) a structure à la Smets and
Wouters (2007), where the nominal interest rate responds to an ination gap,
an output gap and output-gap growth; (2) a structure à la Taylor (1993),
where the nominal interest rate responds to an ination gap and an output
gap; and (3) a structure à la Galí (2015), where the nominal interest rate
responds to an ination gap, an output gap and a natural interest rate dened
as the interest rate in the exible-price economy. There are also three NGDP
growth rules replacing the core functions of the Taylor-type rules with an
NGDP growth targeting function. Finally, our last three rules replace the
core functions of the Taylor-type rules with an NGDP level targeting rule.
As in An and Schorfheide (2007) and Smets and Wouters (2007), we
apply Bayesian techniques to estimate our nine DSGE models (each type is
composed of 3 structures) using US data. Note that such an approach is in
the same vein as Garín et al. (2016). However, the model we use (Smets
and Wouters, 2007) is more far reaching than theirs and widely accepted
by monetary economists and central bankers. As noted below, our research
object and methodology are also more comprehensive, as we study more
policy rules than they do and do so over various time periods, in contrast
to their estimates that run only from 1984 to 2007 (which is also one of our
sample periods). Furthermore, we evaluate the rules not only through their
impact on welfare, as those authors do, but also through di¤erent central
bank loss functions, as well as other criteria. We believe that our analysis
and estimates enrich theirs in an informative and interesting way.
Specically, we estimate all of the parameters over several sample periods:
the overall available sample (1955-2015) and three sub-samples with di¤erent
economic environments and monetary policy styles, from 1955 to 1985, from
1985 to 2007, and from 2007 to 2015.
From the estimations and simulations of our models, di¤ering only in
the specications of the monetary policy rules described above, we analyze,
among other factors: parameters, in-sample and out-sample ts, the cen-
tral banks loss functions, householdswelfare and their variances, impulse
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response functions, and variance decompositions.
We nd that when considering only the central banks loss function, the
estimates generally indicate the superiority of NGDP level targeting rules,
whatever the period. However, if other criteria are considered (tting, house-
holdswelfare and its variance), the central banks objectives are not met
consistently by a single rule for all periods. To achieve the central banks
objectives, for each type of period (stable, crisis, recovery), a di¤erent central
bank reaction function is more appropriate. Policy institutions, which base
their forecasts and policy recommendations on such models and rules, should
renew their estimates regularly. Another policy implication is that minimiz-
ing the Feds selected variances does not automatically entail "good" rst
and/or second moments for household welfare.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the theoretical setup. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology. The
results are presented in Section 4 and interpreted in Section 5. Section 6
concludes, and the Appendix presents additional empirical results.
2 The models
The Smets and Wouters (2007) model is the core model used in this paper.
Yet, in this article and other working paper versions, those authors do not
present the exible-price economy. We do this work in the detailed descrip-
tion of the log-linearized sticky- and exible-price economies in our Online
Appendix.
This (generic) model, also detailed in the Online Appendix, needs to be
completed by adding an ad hoc monetary policy reaction function (Table 1).
Despite their di¤erent formulations, all of these functions include a smoothing
process that captures the degree of rule-specic smoothing.
Taylor-type rules
 Model 1 is the original Smets and Wouters (2007) monetary policy
rule, which gradually responds to deviations of ination (t) from an
ination objective (normalized to be zero), the output gap, dened as
the di¤erence between sticky-price (yt) and exible-price (y
p
t ) outputs
(see the Online Appendix), and deviations of the output gap from the
previous period (4yt  4ypt ).
 Model 2 is the Taylor (1993) monetary policy rule, which gradually re-
sponds to deviations of ination from an ination objective (normalized
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to be zero) and of the output gap, as previously dened.1
 Model 3 is the Galí (2015) monetary policy rule, which gradually re-
sponds to the natural interest rate (rt ), as dened in Galí (2015), de-
viations of ination from an ination objective (normalized to be zero)
and of the output gap, as previously dened.
Nominal GDP growth rules
 Model 4 is the Adapted NGDP Growth Targeting monetary policy
rule, which gradually responds to deviations of nominal output growth
(t +4yt) from an objective2 and deviations of the output gap from
the previous period (as in model 1).
 Model 5 is the NGDP Growth Targeting monetary policy rule, which
gradually responds to deviations of nominal output growth from its
exible-price counterpart.
 Model 6 is the NGDP Growth Targeting monetary policy rule including
a natural interest rate (NIR) component, where the policy gradually
responds to the NIR and deviations of nominal output growth from its
exible-price counterpart.
Nominal GDP level rules
 Model 7 is the Adapted NGDP Level Targeting monetary policy rule,
which gradually responds to nominal output level (pt + yt) deviations
from its exible-price counterpart3 and deviations of the output gap
from the previous period (as in model 1).
 Model 8 is the NGDP Level Targeting monetary policy rule, which
gradually responds to nominal output level deviations from its exible-
price counterpart.
 Model 9 is the NGDP Level Targeting monetary policy rule including
a natural interest rate (NIR) component, where the policy gradually
responds to the NIR and to deviations of the nominal output level from
its exible-price counterpart.
1In the original Taylor rule, the natural interest rate is constant (Taylor, 1993). Log-
linearization around the steady-state eliminates this (constant) natural interest rate. Note
that rule 1 (Smets and Wouters, 2007) does not either include the natural interest rate.
2Nominal output growth is t +4yt.
3The level of nominal output is pt+yt, where prices pt are deducted from the denition
of ination t = pt   pt 1.
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As indicated above, there are three categories of rules. The rst three
(1 to 3) are of the « Taylor-type » . Rules 4 to 6 are nominal GDP rules
targeting nominal GDP growth. Rules 7 to 9 target the level of nominal
GDP.
Rules 4 and 7 include an output gap growth, as in rule 1 (Smets and
Wouters, 2003, 2007). Rules 6 and 9 include the natural interest rate, as
in rule 3 (Galí, 2015). Including these variables allows us to compare the
various rules with their standard versions as presented by the above-cited
authors.
These three categories of rules represent the main policy rules in the
contemporary literature.
As these rules are all ad hoc, they do not require changes in the speci-
cation of the core model. The unique deviating feature of the nine mod-
els therefore comes from their respective monetary policy rule. Concerning
NGDP Level Targeting rules (models 7 to 9), we add to the core model and
the monetary policy rule the denition of prices, derived from (in log form)
t = pt   pt 1, where pt represents the log-price index at time t.
In addition, we assume that prices do not change over time in the exible-
price economy, that is, (in log form) ppt = p
p
t 1 where p
p
t represents the log-
price index in the exible-price economy at time t. Hence, pt = 0 and because
our core model is computed in deviation from the steady state, ppt = p
p
t 1 = 0.
Then, exible-price nominal income is only dened by 4ypt (growth) or ypt
(level). These assumptions are used in rules 4 to 6 (NGDP Growth rules in
Table 1) and 7 to 9 (NGDP Level rules in Table 1).
3 Methodology
3.1 Data
The models, with various monetary policy rules, are estimated between 1955
and 2015 and over three di¤erent periods within this time interval: from
1955Q1 to 1985Q1, a period when the economy was rather unstable and
featured ups and downs and when monetary policy could be characterized as
discretionary; from 1985Q1 to 2007Q4, the Great Moderation era, when the
economy was rather stable and monetary policy more predictable; and from
2007Q1 to 2015Q4, the GFC/ZLB era, the crisis and recovery period when
monetary policy followed an unusual ZLB track.
During our rst sub-sample (1955-1985), monetary policy was rather dis-
cretionary and severely criticized in the literature (Friedman, 1982). Since
the 1980s, the predictability and stability of monetary policy has improved,
7
with many researchers currently recommending rule-based rather than dis-
cretionary monetary policy decisions (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Taylor,
1986, 1987; Friedman, 1982; Taylor, 1993). Notice that monetary policies oc-
curring during our rst sub-sample (1955-1985) were often modeled by a rule
in the literature (Smets and Wouters, 2007; Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy and Papell,
2012; Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al., 2014).
Our second sub-sample (1985-2007) is inspired by Clarida (2010), de-
scribing the period 1985-2007 as the Great Moderation (GM). Although our
second sub-sample is in line with the literature (Clarida, 2010; Meltzer, 2012;
Taylor, 2012; Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy et al., 2014), we extend it until 2007, to
dene a sub-sample with a relatively stable economy (despite the Dot-com
crisis beginning in the 2000s) that can be compared with the crisis period
starting in 2007.
Our third sub-sample (2007-2015) is well documented in the crisis liter-
ature (Gorton, 2009; Cúrdia and Woodford, 2011; Benchimol and Fourçans,
2017).
Data for GDP (Real Gross Domestic Product, GDPC96), ination (Im-
plicit Price Deator, GDPDEF), consumption (Personal Consumption Ex-
penditures, PCEC), investment (Fixed Private Investment, FPI), and em-
ployment (Civilian Employment, CE16OV) are taken from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (U.S. Department of Commerce) database. Data for
population (Civilian Noninstitutional Population, CNP16OV), worked hours
(Average Weekly Hours from Nonfarm Business Sector, PRS85006023), and
hourly wages (Compensation Per Hour fromNonfarmBusiness Sector, COMP-
NFB) are taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of La-
bor) database. Data for the nominal interest rate (E¤ective Federal Funds
Rate, FEDFUNDS) are taken from the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System database. The series are quarterly, and data transformations6
are exactly the same as in Smets and Wouters (2007).
3.2 Calibration
To maintain consistency across models for comparison purposes, we calibrate
all core model parameters as in Smets and Wouters (2007). A detailed de-
scription of this calibration is provided in the Online Appendix.
Except for NGDP targeting rules, monetary policy rule parameters have
the same calibration as in Smets and Wouters (2007) (Table 2).
Of course, r4y equals zero in models 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, and 9. r and ry are
6For each period, we use the period-specic trend to detrend the data over the given
period.
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Law Mean Std.
 Beta 0.75 0.10
r Normal 1.50 0.25
ry Normal 0.125 0.05
ry Normal 0.125 0.05
rn Normal 1.5()/0.5() 0.25
Table 2: Prior distribution of monetary policy rule parameters. () stands
for NGDP growth targeting (rules 4, 5 and 6). () stands for NGDP level
targeting (rules 7, 8 and 9).
not used in models 4 to 9, and rn is not used in models 1 to 3.
As explained in Rudebusch (2002a), rn is higher than one for NGDP
growth targeting rules, and positive and smaller than one for NGDP level
targeting rules.
3.3 Estimation
As in An and Schorfheide (2007) and Smets and Wouters (2007), we apply
Bayesian techniques to estimate our DSGE models with di¤erent specica-
tions of monetary policy rules. We estimate all the parameters presented
above over the four di¤erent periods dened in Section 3.1.
To avoid undue complexity, we do not present all the estimates. We
prefer to concentrate on the analysis of the parameters of the di¤erent mon-
etary rules. The other main estimation results are available in the Online
Appendix, and detailed results are available upon request.
To achieve draw acceptance rates between 20% and 40%, we calibrate the
tuning parameter on the covariance matrix for each model and each period.
Our results, for each model and each period, are based on the standard Monte
Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) algorithm with 2 000 000 draws of 5 parallel
chains (where 1 000 000 draws are used for burn-in).
4 Results
Parameter estimates are detailed in the Online Appendix with all IRFs and
variance decompositions. To draw policy conclusions from our models, we
assess monetary policy rule parameters (estimated values) in Section 4.1, the
modelsin-sample t in Section 4.2 (the modelsout-sample t is presented
in the Online Appendix), central bank loss functions in Section 4.3, and
9
household welfare in Section 4.4. We also discuss some impulse response
functions in Appendix A and variance decompositions in Appendix B.
4.1 Monetary rule parameters
Fig. 1 presents the estimates of the smoothing parameter (), the ina-
tion coe¢ cient (r), the output gap coe¢ cient (ry), the output gap growth
coe¢ cient (r4y) and the nominal income coe¢ cient (rn).
As Fig. 1 shows, the smoothing parameter is in line with the literature
(Justiniano and Preston, 2010), at approximately 0.8, and rather stable over
time, although it appears somewhat smaller for rules 7 and 8, a result in line
with Rudebusch (2002a,b).
The ination coe¢ cient (for rules 1 to 3) remains between 1.5 and less
than 2, also in line with the literature (Smets and Wouters, 2007; Adolfson
et al., 2011). Note that it is smaller during the GFC and recovery period
(GFC/ZLB), suggesting less reaction by the Fed to ination developments
than during more stable periods, notably than during the GM, from 1985 to
2007.
Regarding the coe¢ cient of the output gap, its value varies across the
periods. It appears to be smaller during the GFC/ZLB period (it remains
between 0.10 and 0.15) than between 1985 and 2007 (its value goes from 0.15
to 0.20). This di¤erence is less signicant when we compare the crisis period
with the 1955-1985 period (except for rule 1).
These estimates of the Taylor-type rules (rules 1 to 3) imply a Fed that
does not place greater emphasis (on the margin) on the output gap during
the crisis than during the previous, stabler period.
Regarding the output gap growth coe¢ cient, it varies somewhat across
periods and rules (between 0.1 and 0.2). At least for rule 7, this coe¢ cient
appears to be somewhat higher during the GFC/ZLB than during the GM,
implying a larger reaction to output growth during the crisis than during
the previous, stabler period. For rule 1, this coe¢ cient is highest during
the sub-period 1955-1985, yet it remains the smallest, and signicantly so,
during the crisis sub-period.
The nominal income coe¢ cient associated with the NGDP rules is higher
for the growth rules than the level rules, over all periods, a result that is in line
with the literature (Rudebusch, 2002a). For the growth and level rules, this
coe¢ cient is lower during the GFC/ZLB than otherwise, especially during
the GM. The coe¢ cient for the NGDP level rules changes (with time and
rule), but is lower during the GFC/ZLB period than during the other periods.
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Figure 1: Monetary policy rule parameter values for each model (model 1 to
model 9).
4.2 In-sample t
Assessing in-sample t is important to determine whether historical data
(sample) are more or less in line with data generated by the estimated model.
Table 3 shows the Laplace approximation around the posterior mode (based
on a normal distribution), i.e., log marginal densities, for each model and for
each sample.
Table 3 suggests that the rst NGDP rule in levels (rule 7) best ts the
historical data during the GFC/ZLB period. Another NGDP rule in levels
(rule 8) exhibits the next-best t. Rule 9, the last NGDP rule in levels,
performs best during the GM period, while the Smets and Wouters (2007)
rule ranks just after. Furthermore, rule 1 dominates the other rules over the
period 1955-1985 and over the full sample.
For each period, a di¤erent monetary policy rule best ts the historical
data. Note that standard Taylor-type rules (rules 2 and 3) and NGDP growth
targeting rules (rules 4, 5, and 6) are generally inferior to the other rules in
11
Rules
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1955-2015 -1443 -1511 -1514 -1455 -1478 -1467 -1513 -1573 -1539
2007-2015 -276 -245 -264 -288 -279 -286 -230 -239 -265
1985-2007 -405 -435 -425 -415 -414 -410 -411 -428 -401
1955-1985 -819 -838 -837 -849 -847 -835 -847 -854 -854
Table 3: Log marginal data densities for each model and each period (Laplace
approximation).
explaining historical data.
Nevertheless, note that this result does not imply that models with lower
log marginal data densities should be discarded. Whatever the log marginal
data density function, it may be argued that each model is designed to cap-
ture only certain characteristics of the data. Whether the marginal likelihood
is a good measure to evaluate how well the model accounts for particular as-
pects of the data is an open question (Koop, 2003; Fernández-Villaverde and
Rubio-Ramírez, 2004; Del Negro et al., 2007; Benchimol and Fourçans, 2017).
To further judge the t of the di¤erent models, we calculated the Root
Mean Square Deviations (RMSD) between model-based and historical values
of some variables. Fig. 2 presents in-sample errors, measured as the sum of
normalized RMSD between model-based and historical variables with respect
to the nominal interest rate, ination and output growth for each period.
Normalized RMSD, dened as the ratio between standard RMSD and the
di¤erence between the maximum and the minimum value of the historical
variable (in the relevant sample), facilitates comparison across datasets and
models with di¤erent scales.7
Regarding the interest rate, rule 6 dominates the others in each period
except the GM period, when rule 2 performs best (with 5 and 8 not far in
terms of RMSD values).
When ination and output growth are considered, the RMSDs are higher
during the 2007-2015 period than during the other periods, an unsurprising
result given the instability associated with the GFC/ZLB period. During
this period, rule 6 dominates the others, except for output growth, for which
rules 1 and 3 perform better.
During the GM period, the results are somewhat mixed, but the Taylor
7Although there is no consistent means of normalization in the literature, the range of
the measured data, dened as the maximum value minus the minimum value, is a common
choice. Moreover, this choice is relevant for our case as long as we examine datasets that
include negative values.
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Figure 2: Normalized RMSD between model-based and historical nominal
interest rate, ination, and output di¤erential, for each period (in %).
rule (rule 2) performs poorly compared with the other rules when the RMSD
values for ination and output growth are considered.
These results show that, again, no single rule performs best over the
di¤erent periods and for all variables.
4.3 Central bank losses
In this section, we present several loss measures based on the variance of the
variables of interest from the central banks perspective. These variances are
estimated for each model and for each period.
Many ad hoc central bank loss functions appear in the literature (Svensson
and Williams, 2009; Taylor and Wieland, 2012; Adolfson et al., 2014). Our
methodology intends to summarize all standard possibilities. For various
sets of weights dening these functions, we compute the ex post optimal
rule, consistent with the estimated DSGE model. This approach is used
extensively in the literature to investigate monetary policy rules (Taylor,
13
1979; Fair and Howrey, 1996; Taylor, 1999).
Non-separability between consumption and labor (worked hours) in Smets
and Wouters (2007) households utility function (see Section 4.4) introduces
labor-related variables into the ination and output equations. By minimiz-
ing its loss function with respect to these two equations, the central bank
must also consider labor-related variables, such as wages (price of worked
hours).
Our general central bank loss function, Lt, is dened in line with Galí
(2015), as
Lt = var (t) + yvar (yt   ypt ) + rvar (rt) + wvar (wt) (1)
where y is the weight on output gap variances, r the weight on nomi-
nal interest rate di¤erential variance, and w the weight on wage ination
variance. The weight on price ination variance is normalized to unity, and
var (:) is the variance operator. t is price ination, yt   ypt the output gap,
rt nominal interest rate di¤erential, and wt wage ination8 (see the Online
Appendix for more details about the variables).
In this section, we only present central bank losses with w = 0. The
Online Appendix presents central bank losses with w = 0:5 and w = 1.
First, in Fig. 3, we present the estimated variances of each variable
(ination, output gap, nominal interest rate di¤erential, and wage ination)
entering the central bank loss functions.
The variances of all variables under consideration are signicantly higher
before 1985 and over the full sample. Even during the 2007-2015 period,
these variances were lower than before 1985 and little di¤erent than during
the GM period. The fact that estimated variances over the GFC/ZLB period
are comparable across the models with those of the GM period does not
mean that variances of historical data during the GFC/ZLB and GM are
comparable. Indeed, the variances presented in Fig. 3 are estimated from
the models while assuming that the Fed followed various rules and the US
economy behaved as in the Smets and Wouters (2007) model. The high
ination period cum various signicant ups and downs in economic activity
and interest rates explain the high values observed between 1955 and 1985.
However, changes in the Feds monetary policy and the stabilization pe-
riod that occurred during the 1990s explain the low variance of the GM
8Another loss measure based on the squared distance of variables generated by the
models can be dened:
Lt = 
2
t + yy
2
t + r (rt)
2
+ ww
2
t (2)
Empirically, this type of formulation leads to similar results to those given by Eq. 1.
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Figure 3: Estimated variances of central bank loss function variables, for
each period and each rule.
period relative to the 1955-1985 period. Output variances are somewhat
higher during the GFC/ZLB period than during the GM period, while those
of the ination rate are close. The low interest rates of the GFC/ZLB period
lead to lower variances of the interest rate di¤erentials during the GFC/ZLB
than during the GM period. The variances of wages were also smaller during
the GFC/ZLB period than during the GM period.
Second, we compute ad hoc loss functions based on Eq. 1 (with w = 0,
as was said earlier). Figs. 4 to 7 present central bank losses with respect to
various loss functions, over our time periods and for each monetary policy
rule.
For a given weight on the variance of the interest rate di¤erential (r),
the loss diminishes for all rules and for all periods when the weight on the
variance of the output gap diminishes (vertical observation). For a given
weight on the variance of the output gap (y), the loss diminishes, albeit
to a limited extent, for all rules and for all periods when the weight on the
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Figure 4: Central bank losses, for each rule, between 1955 and 2015
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Figure 5: Central bank losses, for each rule, between 2007 and 2015
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Figure 7: Central bank losses, for each rule, between 1955 and 1985
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variance of the interest rate di¤erential diminishes (horizontal observation).
These results are directly related to the simple (linear) functional form of the
central bank loss function.
Interestingly, the change in the loss is very minor for a given y (horizontal
observation) compared to the change in the loss for a given r (vertical ob-
servation). This result would imply that a central bank gains almost nothing
by including the interest rate di¤erential in its loss function.
One can interpret this result in light of the interest rate smoothing as-
sumption. Most of the monetary policy rules used in the literature assume
interest rate smoothing, as we do. This smoothing implies that the central
bank already minimizes the variances in the interest rate di¤erential over
time, hence the small gain generated by changing the interest rate di¤eren-
tial coe¢ cient in the central bank loss function for a given y (horizontal
observation).
Note also that whatever the values of y and r during the GFC/ZLB,
rules 7 and 8 dominate the others, but rules 1 and 2 lead to nearly similar
values.
For the GM period (1985-2007), the NGDP rules in levels, rules 7 and 8,
dominate even more clearly the other policy reaction functions.
During the 1955-1985 period, NGDP level targeting rule 8 leads to the
lowest loss, but here too, rule 1 performs well.
From the full sample estimates, it appears that NGDP level targeting rule
7 is the best to minimize losses.
From these observations, we infer that during the exceptional GFC/ZLB
period, the Fed would have minimized its loss by following an NGDP rule in
levels, especially rules 7 and 8. However, had it employed Taylor-type rules
1 and 2, the di¤erence in terms of loss would have been minor.
4.4 Householdswelfare
Households utility-based welfare is measured as the sum over a sample-
period of each quarters utility value. The utility function, from Smets and
Wouters (2007), is given by
Ut =
1
1  c (Ct   hCt 1)
1 c exp

c   1
1 + l
L1+lt

(3)
where Ct is householdsconsumption and Lt worked hours. h represents the
householdsconsumption habits, c householdsrelative risk aversion, and l
the Frish elasticity (for further details, see the Online Appendix). exp (:) is
the exponential operator.
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Rules
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1955-2015 2768 6534 2118 4604 3868 4475 2609 3032 3558
2007-2015 6 -11 28 -9 14 22 6 -4 35
1985-2007 226 621 111 195 168 140 273 144 137
1955-1985 816 678 360 999 1000 873 584 234 287
Table 4: Householdswelfare measured as the sum of the rst-period utility
(ut) function over time.
Table 4 presents household welfare estimates for each rule and each pe-
riod. During the GFC/ZLB, rule 9 (targeting the level of NGDP cum the
natural interest rate) leads to the highest welfare. However, during the GM
period, rule 2 (Taylor rule) that dominates (as is the case over the whole sam-
ple period). From 1955 to 1985, rules 4 and 5 appear to result in the highest
welfare. The other NGDP growth targeting rule 6 also performs better than
Taylor-type rules.
One can tentatively infer from these observations that during stable pe-
riods, the traditional Taylor rule maximizes households welfare, whereas
during crises and less-stable periods, some NGDP targeting-type rules are
more appropriate.
In addition to the impact on the level of householdswelfare, it is also
interesting to study the impact on the variance of this welfare. Table 5
presents these estimates.
Rules
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1955-2015 1,44 14,09 0,57 1,17 1,14 1,35 1,89 1,88 0,72
2007-2015 0,04 0,07 0,05 0,02 0,03 0,02 0,04 0,05 0,03
1985-2007 0,09 0,50 0,06 0,07 0,07 0,04 0,17 0,17 0,07
1955-1985 2,21 2,59 0,47 0,91 0,94 0,80 2,37 2,41 1,77
Table 5: Householdswelfare variance for each period and each model.
During the GFC/ZLB period, the NGDP targeting rules 4 and 6 (target-
ing NGDP growth with the natural interest rate included) perform better
than the other rules, but the other NGDP growth targeting rule (5) and rule
9 lead to nearly similar results. During the GM period, rule 6 is the best.
For the 1955-1985 period, rule 3 dominates, with rule 6 performing nearly as
well.
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Note that, over all periods, the standard Taylor rule (2) leads to the
highest variance, i.e., leads to the worst performance in terms of welfare
variance.
From these observations, NGDP growth targeting cum the natural inter-
est rate (rule 6) appears to be a goodrule whatever the economic situation
of the period, and it is the best rule over the GFC/ZLB and GM periods.
5 Interpretation
Table 6 summarizes our results to capture essential facts of our exercise.
1955-2015 2007-2015 1985-2007 1955-1985
Fitting
Marginal density 1 7 9 1
RMSD(rt) 5 6 2,5,8 6
RMSD(t) 5,6 6 5,7,9 6
RMSD(4yt) 9 1,3 9 4,5
Central bank losses
var (t) 7 7,8 7,8 8
var (yt   ypt ) 2 7,8 7,8,9 7,8
var (rt) 1,4,5 NR NR 1
var (wt) 9 2,7,8 2,3,7,8 3
Loss functions* 7 2,7,8 7,8 8
Loss functions** 7 7,8 7,8 8
Households
Welfare mean 2 9 2 4,5
Welfare variance 3 4,6 6 3
NR stands for non-relevant, i.e., impossible to discriminate.
*Including var (t), var (yt   ypt ), and var (rt) only (Section 4.3)
**Including var (t), var (yt   ypt ), var (rt), and var (wt) (Online Appendix)
Table 6: Summary of the best rule(s) for each criterion
In terms of tting the data, the marginal density values show that rule 1
performs better than all others for the full sample and the 1955-1985 period.
Rule 7 is best in terms of log marginal data densities during the GFC/ZLB.
During the GM period, rule 9 leads to the highest marginal density, i.e., the
best t.
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Yet, for reasons explained in Section 4.2, the values of the marginal densi-
ties are not denitive proof that we have the correct ranking of rules. These
values constitute an indication of which rules were more or less followed dur-
ing the di¤erent periods, assuming that the Fed followed a policy rule and
assuming that the economy behaved as in the Smets and Wouters (2007)
model.
From the RMSD of interest rates and ination, NGDP targeting rule 6
performs better during the GFC/ZLB and 1955-1985 periods, whereas rule
5 dominates during the GM period (with rules 7, 8 and 9 being close).
Regarding the RMSD of output growth, the Taylor rule à la Smets and
Wouters (2007) and à la Galí (2015) perform best during the crisis. NGDP
targeting rules dominate over the other periods (rule 9 for the GM period
and rules 4 and 5 from 1955 to 1985).
In terms of out-of-sample forecasts, the results are somewhat di¤erent, as
NGDP growth targeting rule 5 is better during the GFC/ZLB and the other
results are less clear (Online Appendix).
The results are clearer when we analyze the losses of the central bank.
They all lead to the general superiority of NGDP level targeting rules for all
periods with few exceptions. The results are somewhat di¤erent when we
analyze the variances of the specic variables entering the loss functions.
Regarding householdswelfare level, NGDP targeting leads to better re-
sults during the GFC/ZLB period (rule 9) and from 1955 to 1985 (rules 4
and 5), whereas the standard Taylor rule (rule 2) dominates during the GM
and the full sample periods. In terms of welfare variance, the results vary
with the sub-periods with a preference for NGDP growth targeting rules for
the GFC/ZLB and GM periods.
These results are not intended to prove that the Fed followed a given
type of rule depending on the period. An explicit rule is only a model that
attempts to capture some monetary policy parameters explaining how the
central bank determines its interest rate.
According to Table 6, the Feds decisions were generally more in line with
NGDP targeting rules during the GFC and GM than with other rules, to the
extent that the US economy behaved à la Smets and Wouters (2007). Our
estimates also show that the Feds monetary policy, modeled by Taylor rules
and NGDP growth rules, would not have minimized the central banks loss
functions over these periods (GFC/ZLB and GM); NGDP targeting in levels
performs better. The implication is somewhat di¤erent when considering the
impact of each rule on the mean and variance of welfare.
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6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the e¤ects of di¤erent monetary
policy rules on the macroeconomic equilibrium. Specically, we seek to de-
termine, rst, which monetary policy rule is most in line with the historical
data for the US economy and, second, what policy rule would be best to min-
imize the central banks loss function and/or maximize householdswelfare
and/or minimize its variability. The rst consideration is positive, the
second is normative.
To conduct this type of analysis, we compare Taylor-type and nominal in-
come rules through the well-known Smets and Wouters (2007) DSGE model.
We consider nine monetary policy rules. Three are of the Taylor-type
and six are of the nominal income targeting type (NGDP), either in growth or
levels. We test the model with these various rules through Bayesian estima-
tions from 1955 to 2015, over three di¤erent periods: 1955-1985, 1985-2007,
and 2007-2015. These sub-periods are selected to capture the impact of pol-
icy rules given di¤erent economic environments (more or less stable periods
and crisis and recovery periods).
In terms of t with historical data, the marginal density values suggest
that some NGDP targeting rules exhibit the best t during the GFC/ZLB
and GM periods. The Taylor-type rule à la Smets and Wouters (2007) per-
forms best over the 1955-1985 period (and over the full sample). However,
other measures of this t (RMSD estimates) do not always support this
conclusion. Depending on the variable under consideration (interest rate,
ination or output), NGDP targeting rules often dominate the Taylor-type
rules). Several NGDP-type rules often exhibit better forecasting performance
than do Taylor-type rules, at least during the GFC/ZLB period. Out-sample
t tests show that the choice of a monetary policy rule does not signicantly
impact the forecasting performance of the model.
The results regarding the losses of the central bank are clearer. All es-
timates suggest, in general, the superiority of NGDP level targeting rules,
whatever the sub-period.
Regarding householdswelfare, one NGDP rule maximizes its level during
the GFC/ZLB period. During the GM, the Taylor rule performs best. In
minimizing welfare variance, some NGDP rules dominate the other rules.
A rst policy implication is that central banks objectives are not achieved
by a single rule, irrespective of the period in question. For each period, there
is a preferred monetary policy reaction function. In other words, for each
type of period (more or less stable, crisis, recovery), one central bank reaction
function performs better than others. Yet, if we only consider the loss func-
tion of the central bank, the results lead to the general superiority of NGDP
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rules in levels (even if the Taylor rule leads to nearly similar implications
over the GFC/GM periods).
A second implication is that for a given monetary policy rule, parameter
estimates change with respect to the period considered. Policy institutions,
which base their forecasts and policy recommendations on such models and
rules, should renew their estimates regularly to avoid inaccurate policy con-
clusions.
A third policy implication directly concerns central bank objectives. It is
standard to assume that a central bank seeks to minimize a loss function that
includes, at least, ination and output variances. Would this minimization
process automatically lead to a maximization of householdswelfare (and/or
a minimization of householdswelfare variance)? Our results show that this
is not necessarily the case.
7 Appendix
A Impulse response functions
Figs. 8 to 11 present impulse responses of the main variables of interest
(ination, output and welfare) with respect to three shocks (monetary policy,
technology and government expenditure). The IRFs for all variables and all
shocks, as well as a special presentation of on-impact responses, are shown
in the Online Appendix.
The impact of a monetary policy shock on ination is strongest under
rule 6 during the GFC/ZLB period and during the GM period. Rule 3 leads
to the highest impact before 1985 and over the whole sample, but rule 6
performs almost as well. Regarding the short-run impact on output, rule 3
dominates the others during the GFC/ZLB and the GM periods, but rules 6
and 9 do not produce markedly di¤erent results. Rule 6 leads to the highest
impact over the period 1955-1985 and rule 9 over the full sample. When
considering the on-impact on welfare, rule 3 again yields the highest value
from 2007 to 2015, but rule 2 does so over the period 1985-2007. Rule 2
also dominates over the full sample, whereas the NGDP rules in levels do
so during the 1955-1985 period. The impact of the shock to output (and
ination) lasts longer than to welfare, for which it is relatively short.
When considering the technology shock, the on-impact on output is high-
est under rule 6 whatever the period. Concerning the impact on welfare, rule
3 leads to the strongest impact over the GFC/ZLB period, but several other
rules produce results that are nearly as good. The GM period is also char-
acterized by a high value from rule 3, but some other rules perform nearly
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as well. Before 1985 and over the full sample period, the results are some-
what mixed. As with the monetary policy shock, this impact on output lasts
longer than on welfare.
The short-run impact of the government expenditure shock on output
does not vary substantially across rules or periods, at least between the
GFC/ZLB and the GM periods. Its value is greater, however, over the 1955-
1985 period and over the full sample period. The on-impact on welfare during
the 2007-2015 period varies little whatever the rule, whereas rule 2, followed
closely by rules 7 and 8, has the strongest impact over the 1985-2007 period.
Note that if we compare the GM period to the GFC/ZLB period, the
government expenditure shock has an impact on output and welfare that
lasts signicantly longer during the former period than during the latter,
whatever the rule used.
24
10 20 30
M
on
et
ar
y 
po
lic
y
sh
oc
k
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
Inflation
10 20 30
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
Output
10 20 30
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
Welfare
10 20 30
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
sh
oc
k
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
10 20 30
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
10 20 30
1
1.5
2
2.5
10 20 30
G
ov
. s
pe
nd
in
g
sh
oc
k
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
10 20 30
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
10 20 30
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Figure 8: Response of ination, output and welfare to a 1% deviation shock
between 1955 and 2015.
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Figure 9: Response of ination, output and welfare to a 1% deviation shock
between 2007 and 2015.
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Figure 10: Response of ination, output and welfare to a 1% deviation shock
between 1985 and 2007.
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Figure 11: Response of ination, output and welfare to a 1% deviation shock
between 1955 and 1985.
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B Variance decompositions
Figs. 12 to 15 present variance decompositions of the same variables and
the same shocks as in the IRFs analysis (Section A). All of the variance
decompositions and shocks are included in the Online Appendix.
A comparison between the GFC/ZLB and the GM periods is interesting.
In the short and the long run, ination is explained almost completely by the
mark-up shock (Online Appendix). Output variance is impacted by the three
shocks we focus on but also by the risk premium shock. The impact of each
shock depends on the monetary rule. The impact of the monetary shock is
generally greater during the period 2007-2015 than between 1985 and 2007.
It is signicant for both periods but more so during the GFC/ZLB than the
GM period. Specically, during the former period, and under rules 3, 6 and
9, the monetary policy shock explains some 50% of the output variance in
the short run and 70% in the long run, whereas it is signicantly lower under
the other rules. But, in both periods, the technology and the government
expenditure shocks (as well as the risk premium shock) have also their role
to play, especially in the short run. Note further that whatever the shock,
it is always rules 3, 6 and 9 that lead to the highest variance decomposition
for output during the GFC/ZLB period. This result also holds during the
GM except for the government expenditure shock where rule 2 (Taylor rule)
dominates. Furthermore, note that the government expenditure shock has
a relatively lower impact during the GFC/ZLB period than during the GM
period.
In both periods, the impact of the monetary and technology shocks on
welfare (short and long run) is signicant, especially when rules 3, 6 and 9
are used (it is rather small with the other rules). The risk premium also
has a relatively strong impact, notably during the GFC/ZLB period, when
it appears to dominate the others.
The government spending shock has a signicant impact on welfare during
the GM but a smaller one during the GFC/ZLB period.
For the other periods, the technology shock explains a great deal of the
welfare variance, if not always in the short run, at least in the long run.
Output in the long run is also substantially impacted by the technology
shock in the 1955-1985 period and over the full sample period. Of course,
these impacts are more or less signicant depending on the monetary rule
used. Generally, rules 3, 6 and 9 (rules including the natural interest rate
in the monetary rules) explain the highest variance of output and welfare,
whatever the shock, except for the government expenditure shock, where this
pattern is not always respected.
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Figure 12: Short- and long-run variance decompositions of ination, output
and welfare between 1955 and 2015.
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Figure 13: Short- and long-run variance decompositions of ination, output
and welfare between 2007 and 2015.
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Figure 14: Short- and long-run variance decompositions of ination, output
and welfare between 1985 and 2007.
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Figure 15: Short- and long-run variance decompositions of ination, output
and welfare between 1955 and 1985.
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